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ABSTRACT 
 This work explores the response to the global war on terror during the last decade 
in the nation of Poland. Specifically, it examines how visions of the country’s nationhood 
have been used by the leaders of the country’s dominant political party, Law and Justice 
(Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, or PiS), in conjunction with real or imagined terrorist events to 
gain power and further its political agenda. This effort is examined in the context of one 
particular element of Polish nationhood, Sarmatism, which formed in the 1600s and 
reemerged in the first decade of the 2000s as a potent cultural force. Basing its view of 
modern terrorism through a Sarmatian lens and responding with Sarmatian rhetoric has 
proved particularly useful to PiS; not only did it gain power during this decade, but it 
remains the dominant political force in the country. This ascendance of PiS has 
transformed both terrorist and non-terrorist events into perceived existential threats to the 
country, threats that the party has exploited for electoral success. But this success has also 
transformed Poland’s position in its two most important international alliances, the 
European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As a result, any effective 
foreign policy responses directed at Poland must account for the Sarmatian values 
embedded in its nationhood and manipulated by PiS in the political arena. 
v 
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ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, also known as the Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 
polanie Poles, the original inhabitants of the Polish nation 
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość Law and Justice Party (PiS) 
Sarmatians nomads from Persia and the mythical basis for the formation 
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Solidarność Solidarity Party 
szlachta Polish gentry (landowners) 
Sejm Parliament  
U.S.S.R. United Soviet Socialist Republic (Soviet Union) 
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This thesis explores the intersection of nationhood and global terrorism by 
examining the responses of Poland’s political leaders to a series of terrorism-related events 
during the last decade. In doing so, this work demonstrates the crucial importance of 
analyzing Poland’s contemporary experience with terrorism through a particularly Polish 
sense of nationhood, one rooted in Sarmatism.1 It is only by understanding the influence 
of Sarmatian ideals and practices that one can comprehend the actions of the current 
leadership of the Polish nation.2 Moreover, it is through this understanding that a more 
effective set of foreign policy security initiatives can be fostered with Poland and the other 
nations of the Visegrád Group: Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. 
Focusing on the Sarmatian concept of Polish nationhood also alleviates the 
confusion endured by Western observers of the country, who have largely failed to 
comprehend the wild swings of the nation’s foreign relations in the past decade.3 As a 
constant feature in the discourse of the modern Polish state since its founding as the 
Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania in 1569, Sarmatism remains a powerful influence 
over the nation’s psyche and its leaders’ political rhetoric. By focusing on contemporary 
events through the framework of Sarmatism, then, a view of modern Poland emerges that 
is more illuminating than one derived through Western concepts of nationhood. This 
comprehension is vital to implementing a more effective set of Western foreign policy 
                                                 
1 Ewa Thompson, “Sarmatism, or the Secrets of Polish Essentialism,” in Being Poland: A New History 
of Polish Literature and Culture since 1918, ed. Tamara Trojanowska, Joanna Nyzynska, and Przemyslaw 
Czaplinski (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018), Kindle. 
2 Piotr Cap, “‘We Don’t Want Any Immigrants or Terrorists Here’: The Linguistic Manufacturing of 
Xenophobia in the Post-2015 Poland,” Discourse & Society 29, no. 4 (2018): 380–98. 
3 James Traub, “The Party That Wants to Make Poland Great Again,” New York Times Magazine, 
November 6, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/06/magazine/the-party-that-wants-to-make-poland-
great-again.html; and Anne Applebaum, “A Warning From Europe: The Worst Is Yet to Come,” Atlantic, 
October 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/10/poland-polarization/568324/. 
xiv 
initiatives geared toward Poland, especially in the area of security against global terrorism 
and military threats.4  
This Sarmatian description of nationhood, as applied to Poland’s contemporary 
experience with global terrorism, is used as an analytical tool to explore the three most 
significant contemporary “terrorist” events to touch the country: the 2008 plane crash at 
Smoleńsk, Russia, that killed the president and 95 others; the 2015 European Union 
migrant crisis that brought millions of refugees to Europe (although none were known to 
be traveling to Poland); and the 2016 slaying of Polish truck driver Łukasz Urban, who 
died in a terrorist attack on a Berlin Christmas market.5 The analysis of each of these events 
shows how the manipulation of Sarmatian values by the leaders of the Law and Justice 
Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość in Polish, or PiS) continues to influence the nation’s 
domestic politics and foreign relations, with significant implications for its most important 
alliances: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union. 
Using a Sarmatian analysis also helps Western policymakers better tailor their 
foreign policies toward Poland to counter the sometimes toxic strain of xenophobic 
nationalism that can be found among Sarmatian values. At a time when the European Union 
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization face great challenges to their internal unity and 
possible external conflicts with an unstable Russia and an ambitious China, retaining 
Poland in these Western alliances is crucial.6 This goal will not be accomplished without 
                                                 
4 Aleksandra Cichocka et al., “What Inverted U Can Do for Your Country: A Curvilinear Relationship 
between Confidence in the Social System and Political Engagement,” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 115, no. 5 (2017): 883–902, https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000168; and Piotr Buras and Josef 
Janning, “Divided at the Centre: Germany, Poland, and the Troubles of the Trump Era” (London: European 
Council on Foreign Relations, December 19, 2018), https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/divided_at_ 
the_centre_germany_poland_and_the_troubles_of_the_trump_era. 
5 Emily Tamkin, “Has the Clock Run Out on the Smolensk Controversy?,” Foreign Policy, April 10, 
2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/10/has-the-clock-run-out-on-the-smolensk-conspiracy/; Monika 
Sieradzka, “Smolensk: The Tragedy That Defined Polish Politics,” Deutsche Welle, April 10, 2018, 
https://www.dw.com/en/smolensk-the-tragedy-that-defined-polish-politics/a-43328611; Cap, “‘We Don’t 
Want Any Immigrants or Terrorists Here’”; and Notker Oberhäuser, “Polish-German Relations: The 
Sticking Points,” Deutsche Welle, June 4, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/polish-german-relations-the-
sticking-points/a-44074544. 
6 Timothy Snyder, The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 
2018). 
xv 
first understanding the values that underlay Polish nationhood and then analyzing how they 
are manipulated by PiS to its advantage. 
In pursuing its current path of isolationist, xenophobic, and autocratic policies, the 
current ruling party in Poland has destabilized the entire region, which benefits its rulers in 
the short term despite disastrous implications for the future.7 Offering a better 
understanding of the essential elements of Polish nationhood and applying them to the 
proclaimed counterterrorism policies of the current administration, this thesis calls for 
reengagement of the West into an active dialogue with Poland’s leaders and citizens. This 
new discourse, focusing on Poland’s understanding of itself instead of projecting Western 
values onto it, echoes similar efforts to bolster the Solidarność (Solidarity) movement of 
the 1980s and 1990s. That effort was successful in restoring a vibrant civil society and 
active democracy to a nation that has always treasured both among its founding ideals.8 
Ceding the creation of this discourse on nationhood in contemporary Poland risks the 
perversion of these ideals in the name of a more toxic version of nationalism that serves 
neither its nor the West’s long-term interests. In the nation’s coat of arms, Poland’s white 
eagle faces west; now the West must make an effort to ensure that the eagle’s head does 
not turn.  
                                                 
7 “EU to Sue Poland, Hungary and Czechs for Refusing Refugee Quotas,” BBC News, December 7, 
2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-42270239. 
8 David Ost, Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics: Opposition and Reform in Poland since 1968 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990); and Seth A. Jones, A Covert Action: Reagan, the CIA, and 
the Cold War Struggle in Poland (New York: Norton, 2018). 
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This thesis explores the response to the global war on terror during the last decade 
in one of Central and Eastern Europe’s largest and most populous countries, Poland. 
Specifically, it examines how visions of the country’s nationhood have been used by the 
leaders of the country’s dominant political party, Law and Justice (Prawo i 
Sprawiedliwość, or PiS), in conjunction with real or imagined terrorist events to gain power 
and further their political agenda. This effort is examined in the context of one particular 
element of Polish nationhood, Sarmatism, which formed as an original culture in the 1600s 
and reemerged in the first decade of the 2000s as a potent cultural force. Basing its view 
of modern terrorism through a Sarmatian lens and responding with Sarmatian rhetoric 
proved particularly useful to PiS; not only did it gain power during this decade, but it also 
remains the dominant political force in the country.1  
This ascendance of PiS indeed owes much to the party’s ability to use Sarmatian 
rhetoric and images to transform both terrorist and non-terrorist events into perceived 
existential threats to the country, threats that it has exploited for electoral success. But this 
success has also transformed Poland’s position in its two most important international 
alliances, the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
Sarmatian values, as embodied in PiS’s domestic and foreign policies, carry significant 
implications for Poland’s future in these alliances; they may have already eroded Poland’s 
place in the Western democratic-market capitalist order. As scholar Alexandra Gheciu 
noted in 2019, “Recent developments . . . are a potent reminder that not all middle powers 
[such as Poland] are alike; on the contrary, based on their socially constructed, historically 
specific definitions of identity, they can perform a diversity of international roles—in 
support of, or, conversely, as obstacles to liberal internationalism.”2  
                                                 
1 Hubert Tworzecki, “Poland: A Case of Top-Down Polarization,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 681, no. 1 (January 2019): 97–119, https://doi.org/10.1177/ 
0002716218809322. 
2 Alexandra Gheciu, “NATO, Liberal Internationalism, and the Politics of Imagining the Western 
Security Community,” International Journal 74, no. 1 (2019): 33, https://doi.org/10.1177/ 
002070201983645. 
2 
Other “middle powers” in Central and Eastern Europe, such as those of the 
Visegrád Group (Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, along with Poland) have 
undergone similar transformations of their political landscapes to a more nationalistic, 
xenophobic, and illiberal orientation.3 Although this thesis touches upon the contemporary 
experiences of Poland’s regional cohort, however, it remains focused on Poland itself as 
the most crucial country of the four Visegrád nations. By its very size, Poland is both the 
most populous, with about 60 percent of the group’s total population, as well as the largest, 
with well over 50 percent of the region’s landmass. The country also has the region’s 
biggest economy; this accomplishment was driven by a quarter century of continuous 
economic growth, a boast that no other country in the EU can make. As Poland goes, then, 
the Visegrád Group follows.  
It is not just its geographic, demographic, or economic profile that makes Poland a 
particularly important country to understand in this global age of terrorism. Hailed as the 
preeminent example of a country that was able to reorient its economy from a centrally 
planned scheme into a market-based platform, the nation was applauded by the West for 
completing a successful transition from Soviet-dominated communism to Western-
oriented democracy.4 These trends were symbolized by Poland’s accession into NATO 
(1999), which reversed its previous membership in the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact, and the 
EU (2004), which promised to align its future with Western markets, social values, and 
political agendas. Characteristic of the tone of this era was American diplomat Ronald 
Asmus’s observation that “the vision was clear: a new NATO between the United States 
and a Europe whole and free committed to tackling the new threats of the 21st century,” 
specifically global terrorism.5  
                                                 
3 Ruth Wodak, The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean (London: Sage 
Publications, 2015), Kindle. 
4 Wojciech Przybylski, “Explaining Eastern Europe: Can Poland’s Backsliding Be Stopped?,” Journal 
of Democracy 29, no. 3 (July 2018): 52–64. 
5 Ronald Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2002), loc. 341, Kindle. 
3 
Nevertheless, as this thesis argues, these transformations were not so complete or 
irreversible as Western observers thought at the time.6 Indeed, the last decade—
specifically, the period under scrutiny here, one greatly influenced by the global war on 
terrorism—has shown how fragile and superficial these changes may have been. As 
Wojciech Przybylski recently observed,  
A mere four years ago, Poland was widely viewed as an exemplar of 
democratic transformation in Central and Eastern Europe and a pro-
democracy force on the international stage. . . . By 2018, however, Poland 
had become the first EU country to be threatened with sanctions under 
Article 7 of the Lisbon Treaty over infringements of the rule of law.7  
It is precisely this journey, explored through the interplay of nationhood and terrorism, that 
this work explores.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Using Poland as a case study, how has the Law and Justice Party used the global 
war on terror to further its political agenda?  
B. REMARKS ON NATIONHOOD AND TERRORISM IN POLISH 
HISTORY 
For two centuries, the Poles were not recognized as a nation, at least not one that 
claimed control over territory with recognized borders. The Polish “nation” was a romantic 
ideal, a nationalist rallying point, a nostalgic reference, but never an actual state. After 
Poland disappeared from the map of Europe in 1772, Poles were Austrians, Russians, or 
Prussians—to name but a few nationalities—but never Polish citizens.8 The Polish national 
anthem enshrines this imagined community even today: “Jeszcze Polska nie zginęła” 
                                                 
6 As one journalist recently noted, “Poland today appears to be the antithesis of its own post-
transitional success. Once a powerhouse of democratic institutions and liberal change, it is now slowly 
descending into a mafia-like state.” Mateusz Mazzini, “Poland’s Historical Revisionism Is Pushing It into 
Moscow’s Arms,” Financial Times, February 12, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/12/polands-
historical-revisionism-is-pushing-it-into-moscows-arms-smolensk-kaczynski-pis-law-justice-holocaust-
law/. 
7 Przybylski, “Explaining Eastern Europe.” 
8 A series of partitions by Poland's neighboring, multi-ethnic empires--Prussia, Russia and Austria--
took place between 1772 and 1795. Karen Majewski, Traitors & True Poles: Narrating a Polish-American 
Identity, 1880-1939 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2003). 
4 
(Poland is not yet lost, as long as we are living).9 As Jan Józef Lipski noted in his essay on 
Poland’s place in Europe, “The experience of years of tyranny and struggle for liberation 
has probably been forever ingrained in the Polish national consciousness . . . something 
which could be called the Polish national character.”10 
The achievement of national sovereignty by Poles, however, was not just a struggle; 
outright violence—including armed force—was one factor the reemergence of the modern 
Polish nation in the twentieth century. When almost 150 years of Polish non-existence 
came to an end with the formation of the modern Polish nation in 1918, it was not solely 
the events of the First World War that had contributed to its revival. As recent scholarly 
work by Felicitas von Weikersthal has argued, modern terrorism was also fundamental to 
the formation of the newly recognized country of Poland.11 Such a claim would have likely 
been inconceivable just a generation ago, when scholars of Polish studies focused primarily 
on describing the nation’s drive toward freedom. As von Weikersthal’s work shows, and 
what this thesis explores, examining terrorism as a factor in Poland’s nationhood yields a 
radically different interpretation of its contemporary experience, especially in its relations 
with the West.  
A more nuanced view of Polish nationhood emerges, then, when terrorism is used 
as a concept for exploring its nationhood.12 As Andrzej Wajda, the country’s most notable 
director, showed in his trilogy of films about Poland during and after the Second World 
War, the country faced insurgencies for years after official wartime hostilities had ceased.13 
                                                 
9 “The Story behind Poland’s National Anthem,” Kafkadesk, February 23, 2019, https://kafkadesk. 
org/2019/02/23/the-story-behind-polands-national-anthem/. For a broader study of how national 
consciousness is created, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 1991). 
10 Jan Józef Lipski, “Two Fatherlands, Two Patriotisms,” in Between East and West: Writings from 
Kultura, ed. Robert Kostrzewa (New York: Hill & Wang, 1990), 52–71. 
11 Felicitas Fischer von Weikersthal, “From Terrorists to Statesmen: Terrorism and Polish 
Independence,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2018): 1–19, https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X. 
2018.1471967. 
12 Timothy Snyder, Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning (New York: Tim Duggan 
Books, 2015); and Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic 
Books, 2010). 
13 The trilogy consisted of Pokolenie [A Generation] in 1955; Kanał [The Sewer] in 1957; and Popiół i 
diament [Ashes and Diamonds] in 1958. Andrzej Wajda, Double Vision: My Life in Film, trans. Rose Medina 
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1989).  
5 
Ironically, it was Wajda, who worked under the constraints of the officially sanctioned 
Polish film industry, who found the most creative ways to depict terrorism as a central 
theme of the Polish postwar experience.14 Many contemporary scholars and journalists, 
including Timothy Snyder and Anne Applebaum, have been held captive by contemporary 
political exigencies—including overt political critiques of PiS in the apparent hope of 
chipping away at its support—than Wajda ever was in his much subtler battles with the 
authorities.15  
Between the complexities of the Polish artist, Wajda, and the blunt didacticism of 
the American writers, Snyder and Applebaum, where have Poland’s contemporary political 
leaders placed terrorism in the national dialogue? The answers are no less contentious 
among Western observers. Descriptions of terrorism in the political world of Poland 
certainly have been both explicit and agenda-driven, especially after the nation moved out 
of the Soviet orbit and closer to the West. For example, as it sought to strengthen its ties to 
NATO, it was the fear of terrorism (as exemplified by 9/11), no matter how remote, that 
led the country to allow secret interrogation camps and even missiles to be placed on its 
soil. In the first decade of the new millennium, terrorism became one bridge between 
Poland and the West, first through NATO and then by joining the EU in 2004.16  
Nevertheless, the past several years have witnessed an abrupt turn of events as 
Poland suddenly turned on the liberal social values and democratic capitalism of the West 
                                                 
14 Anna Misiak, “Don’t Look to the East: National Sentiments in Andrzej Wajda’s Contemporary Film 
Epics,” Journal of Film and Video 65, no. 3 (Fall 2013): 26–39. 
15 Applebaum (who is married to Polish politician Radosław Sikorski) and Snyder have been harshly 
critical of PiS and its efforts to destabilize its role in the EU, especially as it favors Russian influence in the 
region. Anne Applebaum, “A Warning from Europe: The Worst Is Yet to Come,” Atlantic, October 2018, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/10/poland-polarization/568324/; and Timothy Snyder, 
The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2018). For a 
description of Snyder as activist-scholar, see Jacob Mikanowski, “The Bleak Prophecy of Timothy 
Snyder,” Chronicle Review, April 12, 2019, https://www.chronicle.com/interactives/20190412 
snyder. 
16 Malgorzata Kossowska et al., “Relationships between Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Terrorism 
Threat, and Attitudes towards Restrictions of Civil Right: A Comparison among Four European Countries,” 
British Journal of Psychology 102 (2011): 245–259; Piotr Cap, Proximization: The Pragmatics of Symbolic 
Discourse Crossing (Amsterdam: John Benjamin Publishing, 2013); and Piotr Cap, Legitimisation in 
Political Discourse: A Cross-Disciplinary Perspective on the Modern U.S. War Rhetoric (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2006). 
6 
with the decisive election of the Law and Justice Party in 2015. Whereas global terrorism 
had brought the nation closer to the West in the previous decades, it became a wedge issue, 
both domestically and internationally. In its use by PiS, proclaimed terrorist events have 
been transformed into Western threats that strike at the very heart of the Polish nation, a 
dynamic that shaped its response to the EU migrant crisis in 2015.17 One of the few 
academics to make sense of these changes is Piotr Cap, who has explored terrorism as a 
dynamic factor in contemporary politics as well as a concept rooted in Poland’s sense of 
nationhood; this thesis subsequently applies Cap’s theories to contemporary Western 
counterterrorism efforts involving Poland.18 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW: POLISH NATIONHOOD AND SARMATISM 
What is a nation? The answer can be as simple or as complex as one wishes. A 
nation can exist simply by being recognized as such by the international community, if 
only by one other nation. It can exist as a linguistic group; a bloodline; an ethnic, racial, or 
tribal group; a geographic area with borders; or even as a group of people with common 
beliefs. Yet the nation must first be defined, using whatever parameters, before its role in 
response to outside forces can be discussed. As one defines a nation, one is also defining 
its values; this social construction of reality, as Benedict Anderson describes it, is thus vital 
to understanding how that nation responds to international events.19 
Understanding nationhood is especially important when discussing Poland, where 
Western observers have often been confused by the seemingly irrational choices made by 
the country’s contemporary leaders—choices that defied the West’s expectations of how 
the leaders of a modern, European nation should act.20 Many Western observers assumed 
that every nation would be based on not only sovereignty but also a desire to modernize, 
                                                 
17 “Poland’s Ruling Party Does Well in the Heartland, but Not in Big Cities,” Economist, October 24, 
2018, https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/10/24/polands-ruling-party-does-well-in-the-heartland-but-
not-in-big-cities. 
18 Piotr Cap, “‘We Don’t Want Any Immigrants or Terrorists Here’: The Linguistic Manufacturing of 
Xenophobia in the Post-2015 Poland,” Discourse & Society 29, no. 4 (2018): 380–398. 
19 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 4.  
20 Przybylski, “Explaining Eastern Europe.”  
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improve the material standards of its people, and engage with the international order. This 
analytical framework presumed that a country’s leadership would naturally make rational 
decisions to meet these goals, which were also presumed to be supported by those 
governed.21  
This framework served scholars well in the immediate aftermath of the breakup of 
the Warsaw Pact after 1990. Over the subsequent two decades, this prevailing Western 
view seemed vindicated by the region’s swing toward democracy, free markets, and social 
liberalism. Be that as it may, this era of optimism lasted less than a generation; today, 
Western-derived notions of nationalism seem largely inapplicable to Poland and its 
approach to international relations.22 In order to address this inadequacy, this thesis first 
suggests that a Polish-derived conception of nationhood is better suited to providing 
insights into the nation’s current response to terrorist and military threats. Second, this 
work serves as a reminder that one must not take for granted the assumption that other 
nations will inevitably pursue the typical Western goals of economic advancement, the 
spread of civil liberties, and integration into international alliances. This course is fraught 
with challenges, especially without engagement in Western alliances such as NATO and 
the EU.  
Indeed, a crucial limitation on the scholarship of Central and Eastern Europe in the 
declining days of the Cold War and its aftermath was the assumption that countries outside 
the Western orbit shared the same goals, values, and frameworks as the West. Bolstering 
this view, the political and economic reforms of the 1990s and 2000s seemed to suggest 
that the region’s countries, unburdened by the dominance of the Soviet Union, had returned 
to their historical norms of democracy and market capitalism; these forces would then, 
                                                 
21 Perhaps the most nuanced description of the region from the early 1990s came from scholar George 
Schöpflin. But even Schöpflin wrote that the main challenge of transitioning societies in Eastern Europe 
was “catching up with the West” as though that path had been predestined. George Schöpflin, Politics in 
Eastern Europe 1945–1992 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993). 
22 Gheciu, “Politics of Imagining the Western Security Community.” 
8 
inevitably, lead them away from dangerous paths of isolated nationalisms, and they would 
take place in the new international order.23  
Perhaps no work embodies the optimism—as well as the analytical limitations—of 
nationalism in the post–Cold War era than Francis Fukuyama’s 1992 work, The End of 
History. Positing that democracy and capitalism are inevitable—as evidenced by the 
nations of Central Europe reclaiming their sovereignty and reorienting toward Western 
democracies—Fukuyama believed that the new, liberal order would inhibit the rise of 
dangerous strains of nationalism.24 This new nationalism would also bolster international 
projects such as the EU; as Fukuyama subsequently noted, scholars should not have been 
concerned about the threat of nationalism but about the threat of new technologies that 
could be used against democratic capitalism.25  
As the rise of authoritarian, xenophobic parties such as Fidesz and Jobbik in 
Hungary and Law and Justice in Poland have shown, these nationalist analyses of 
Fukuyama and Anderson have subsequently been inadequate in explaining the rise of the 
right and the rejection of liberal Western values. However, this thesis goes beyond 
describing how dominant Western narratives have largely failed to illuminate the region’s 
rightward turn. For there is an alternative analysis that can be employed to understand 
Polish nationhood: the exclusively Polish concept of Sarmatism. Any understanding of the 
Polish nation—including its modern state—must include a consideration of Sarmatism as 
a seminal influence.  
The concept of Sarmatism is the best tool for describing contemporary Polish 
politics in the context of the nation’s history. It allows for the complexities and seeming 
contradictions that are omitted from a strict geopolitical analysis. Furthermore, specific to 
a discussion on terrorism, it is one of the best avenues to explain the seemingly topsy-turvy 
                                                 
23 In his pivotal Imagined Communities, Anderson stated that he expected the U.S.S.R. not to exist in 
the new millennium, describing the country “as the precursor of a twenty-first century internationalist 
order.” Ten months later, the U.S.S.R. was dissolved; many of its successor states were put on the path to 
EU and NATO membership within a decade, almost seamlessly. Anderson, Imagined Communities, xi.  
24 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).  
25 Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002).  
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world of Polish foreign relations to an audience outside of Poland. This last point is crucial, 
as most Western observers, including some of the most celebrated writers on the subject, 
have been baffled as the country has turned toward authoritarianism and xenophobia. As 
leading journalist (and naturalized Pole) Anne Applebaum recently summarized this turn 
in the Atlantic,  
Poland’s economy has been the most consistently successful in Europe over 
the past quarter century. Even after the global financial collapse in 2008, 
the country saw no recession. What’s more, the refugee wave that has hit 
other European countries has not been felt here at all. There are no migrant 
camps, and there is no Islamist terrorism, or terrorism of any kind.26  
Yet Applebaum’s last insight shows the danger in ignoring terrorism and its usefulness to 
PiS in contemporary Polish politics. In contrast, this thesis first argues that not only has 
Poland experienced terrorism in various forms, but terrorism itself has had a significant 
impact on Poland’s domestic social policies, international relations, and sense of itself as a 
nation. Equally important, Sarmatism has been a persistent influence in this process as it is 
the vital link between each contemporary terrorist event and the discursive narrative 
created by PiS. It is this interaction of Sarmatism and terrorism, manipulated by the leaders 
of PiS, that explains why Poland has charted a different course over the past decade.  
Looking at terrorism through the framework of Sarmatism also places a firmly 
Pole-centric set of ideas at the heart of the analysis, which is a necessary corrective 
approach to the last generation of scholars who examined Eastern Europe through Western 
                                                 
26 Applebaum, “A Warning from Europe,” 55.  
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references to representative democracy and modernization.27 Building on recent works by 
Piotr Cap and Ruth Wodak, for example, this thesis addresses a deficiency in Western 
scholarly work on Eastern Europe that too often emphasizes what is wrong or aberrant in 
the political rhetoric of the region’s nations. That view, often based in linguistic or cultural 
ignorance that presupposes Western policies are inherently more logical or practical than 
homegrown remedies, has led to a seemingly endless sense of frustration by observers such 
as Applebaum and others.28 Instead, this study takes the perspective that global terrorism, 
like all politics, is essentially local in how it is understood by the populace. This is 
especially important in understanding how terrorism is perceived in Poland, a country 
that—while not having directly experienced a terrorist attack in its modern history—has 
been greatly influenced by the global war on terror. Thus, terrorism must be explored in its 
local context—in Poland’s case, through the political discourse of PiS’s leaders, greatly 
influenced by the legacy of Sarmatism—to understand its impact and to gauge the West’s 
foreign policy stance more effectively.  
By examining the continuing influence of nationalism in Poland and other Central 
and Eastern European post-socialist countries, this thesis suggests that there are ways to 
counter its potentially destructive effects on international relations.29 It is by revisiting the 
                                                 
27 Put another way, this work explores the continuities of the national experience in contrast with the 
disjuncture of the post-communist era; this work also counters the assumption that Eastern European 
nations would naturally follow an unceasing path toward representative democracies in the post-communist 
era. For a typical view of Eastern Europe’s challenges at that time, see George Schöpflin, “Post-
Communism: Constructing New Democracies in Central Europe,” International Affairs 67, no. 2 (April 
1991): 235–50, https://doi.org/10.2307/2620828. Schöpflin now serves in the European Parliament as a 
member of the right-wing, nationalist Fidesz Party. Schöpflin, who now serves under his original, 
Hungarian name, György Schöpflin, suggested that putting pig’s heads on border fences would deter 
Muslim migrants from coming to Hungary and that the West is driving a conspiracy to transform Hungary 
by settling Muslim migrants there. Cynthia Kroet, “Hungarian MEP: Pig Heads on Border Fence Would 
Deter Migrants,” Politico, August 22, 2016, https://www.politico.eu/article/hungarian-mep-gyorgy-
schopflinpig-heads-on-border-fence-would-deter-migrants/; and “Hungarian MEP György Schöpflin: 
‘Nationhood Is the Answer,’” YouTube, video, 1:12, posted by Deutsche Welle News, May 3, 2018, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Z7dn0B_API. 
28 In an interesting comparison, Ruth Wodak asks essentially the same question as Applebaum in her 
work on right-wing nationalist parties: “Many people react to [the rise of extremist parties] with surprise, 
asking themselves, how could this happen? And why is it happening now?” She then discusses how this 
extremism has been “normalized” or mainstreamed in political discourse. Wodak, The Politics of Fear, loc. 
110.  
29 Alexandra Gheciu, “Remembering the Roman Past, Building a European Future,” International 
Relations 28, no. 4 (December 2014): 449–55, https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117814533043b. 
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essential elements of a nation’s identity—or, at least, how these elements are manipulated 
by a nation’s political leaders—that one may better understand the seemingly anti-Western, 
illiberal courses that these nations have taken in the last decade.30 This realization is a 
necessary first step if the main Western alliances—the EU and NATO—are to adapt to new 
military and security threats. If Western leaders fail to understand these forces and the 
impact on regional leaders’ decisions, the vacuum will be filled by nations that do 
understand them and will gladly exploit them, chiefly, Russia.31  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN AND CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
In reconciling the contradictory responses to terrorism by contemporary Polish 
leaders, this study broadly addresses the deficient understanding of the country among 
Western leaders and scholars. The thesis then argues that the Western-derived conceptions 
of nationhood largely fail to explain Poland’s contemporary political scene, insofar as they 
are disconnected from an understanding of the country’s social and cultural history. In their 
place, this work offers a Polish-derived conception of nationhood—one rooted in 
Sarmatian values and practices—that even pre-dates, as Joanna Nyżyńska describes it, the 
“semiotic code [that] was rooted in the Romantic tradition, which elevated the victimhood, 
heroism, and martyrdom that resonated in the rhetoric of ‘traditional Polish values.’”32 As 
is argued throughout the remaining chapters, it is this Sarmatian nationhood that continues 
to be an essential value of Polish national life. To fail to understand Sarmatism and its 
influence is to fail to understand Poland.  
                                                 
30 For a contrasting view that emphasizes the role of the political process itself as a vital influence on 
electoral outcomes, see Tworzecki, “Poland: A Case of Top-Down Polarization.” 
31 Snyder, The Road to Unfreedom. For an overview of the current Russian regime’s ability to use 
terrorism to further its own political agenda, see David Satter, The Less You Know, the Better You Sleep: 
Russia’s Road to Terror and Dictatorship under Yeltsin and Putin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2016). Another excellent description of Russia’s criticism of NATO’s expansion and its agility at 
countering NATO’s solidarity can be found in Stephen M. Walt, The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s 
Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018), 
Kindle. 
32 Joanna Nyżyńska, “The Politics of Mourning and the Crisis of Poland’s Symbolic Language after 
April 10,” East European Politics and Society 24, no. 4 (Fall 2010): 467–79, https://doi.org/10.1177/ 
0888325410377656. 
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Grounded in the history of the nation and the definitions of terrorism, this work 
analyzes three contemporary events in which a Sarmatian understanding of global terrorism 
has been an influential factor in Poland’s national discourse: the myth of Smoleńsk (2008), 
the European Union migrant crisis (2015); and the death of Łukasz Urban (2016).33 Each 
of these events resulted in major changes to Poland’s political landscape, as PiS leaders 
largely succeeded in shaping the dominant discourse on terrorism in Poland, one that was 
politically advantageous to the party. Yet each event has been quite distinct. The myth of 
Smoleńsk was built upon a simple airplane accident that PiS reshaped into a terrorist attack 
by an unknown entity, variously described as either an internal or external threat. Similarly, 
the party responded to the EU migrant crisis by again creating a perceived terrorist threat 
that was poised to strike at the religious and cultural basis of the nation before eventually 
destroying all of Europe. Moreover, with the death of Łukasz Urban, PiS decried with 
accuracy that terrorism had taken the life of a Pole, yet the fact that the event took place in 
neighboring Germany was used by the party to show that even its allies were now working 
against Poland.  
In explaining the past decade of Poland’s increasingly contentious relationship with 
its EU and NATO partners, this thesis first provides an overview of the nation’s history, 
including its formative experience as a modern nation-state, and the Sarmatian values that 
were embedded in it. It then traces the development of Polish nationhood through the 
partitions of the country by its regional rivals, its brief re-emergence as an independent 
nation between the two World Wars, and its decades of domination by the Soviet Union 
before leading the region’s generally peaceful transition to democracy and market 
capitalism in the 1990s. After describing the country’s apparent integration into Western 
                                                 
33 Monika Sieradzka, “Smolensk: The Tragedy That Defined Polish Politics,” Deutsche Welle, April 
10, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/smolensk-the-tragedy-that-defined-polish-politics/a-43328611; Michal 
Strzałkowski, “Fortress Europe Lives on in Poland,” Euractiv, May 28, 2018, https://www.euractiv.com/ 
section/justice-home-affairs/news/fortress-europe-lives-on-in-poland/; and Włodzimierz Szczepański, 
“Państwo Zadba o rodzinę kierowcy, który zginął w Berlinie: Beata Szydło przyznała specjalną rentę 
bliskim Łukasza Urbana [State will take care of family of driver who died in berlin: Beata Szydło granted a 
special pension to those close to Łukasz Urban],” Na: Temat, December 23, 2016, https://natemat.pl/ 
197617,beata-szydlo-przyznala-specjalna-rente-rodzinie-lukasza-urbana-kierowcy-ktory-zginal-w-berlinie. 
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alliances such as NATO and the EU, it then explores Poland’s unexpected turn away from 
them in the last decade.  
The final, expository chapter describes the workings of Poland’s leading political 
party, PiS, through an analysis adapted from The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior 
Is Almost Always Good Politics and traces its rise in power based on its manipulation of 
Sarmatian cultural themes. In the analytical section, the thesis explores three discrete 
events in the 2010s that demonstrate how PiS leaders have used Sarmatian values in 
response to real or imagined terrorist events and how this discourse has shaped Poland’s 
relationship with its Western partners. Finally, this work uses the framework developed in 
The Dictator’s Handbook to offer some pragmatic views to Western policymakers that may 
create a constructive dialogue (and, presumably, a set of foreign policies) that will integrate 
and not alienate Poland from its Western partners.34  
                                                 
34 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is 
Almost Always Good Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), Kindle. 
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II. METHODOLOGY: SARMATISM IN POLISH NATIONHOOD 
Whether one argues that Sarmatism is based on the nation’s actual historical 
experience—as some on the extreme political right claim—or on a “foundational myth”—
as scholar Joanna Nyżyńska has noted—its impact as a historical and cultural force in 
contemporary politics has been decisive.35 The use of Sarmatian rhetoric, themes, and 
images by PiS was perhaps the most crucial element in its electoral success after 2010. As 
this chapter explains, PiS itself may be seen as a modern Sarmatian political party. 
Moreover, its continued manipulation of Sarmatian values during the last decade, 
specifically in response to real or imagined terrorist acts, has continued to serve the party—
if not the democracy—well. 
A. THE SARMATIANS 
Originating in Persia around 500 BC, the Sarmatians were a warrior class that 
eventually moved into the most southeastern reaches of Europe over the next nine 
centuries. Despite the archeological documentation of their existence, however, their 
transformation into the seminal ruling class of nascent Poland is much more difficult to 
determine. One difficulty in tracing the history of Sarmatians into Poles is the fundamental 
place of Roman Catholic Christianity in Polish nationhood, which stands in stark contrast 
to the Sarmatians’ Eastern origins. It is essential, however, to explore this contradiction 
and the space it provides in reconciling the continuing contradictions that characterize 
Polish nationhood through the present day.  
The formal date of the foundation of the Kingdom of Poland is 966, when Mieszko I 
of the Piast dynasty accepted Christianity and its Western ties as he sought allies in the 
country’s skirmishes over neighboring northern and western lands. Through his baptism 
and the dynasty’s series of alliances through marriages, the Piasts consolidated their rule 
                                                 
35 Maria Barłowska, “Chivalric Death in Sarmatian Culture,” Passage to Knowledge (blog), accessed 
August 7, 2019, http://wilanow-palac.pl/chivalric_death_in_sarmatian_culture.html; Michał Mochocki, 
“The Sarmatian Cultural Turn in 21st-Century Poland,” in (Re)Visions of History in Language and Fiction, 
ed. Dorota Guttfeld, Monika Linke, and Agnieszka Sowińska (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 2012), 208–24; and Nyżyńska, “The Politics of Mourning.” 
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over Wielkopolska, or Greater Poland, in the area corresponding with the Poznań region in 
today’s western Poland. Still, the country remained decentralized and fragmented to the 
point that successive rulers often split the country apart along new hereditary lines or 
alliances, only to reform in other permutations with the next generation of rulers. It was 
within this chaotic nature of Poland’s earliest centuries that the Sarmatians provided 
another unifying set of principles that provided stability and protection to the peasants 
while retaining the same benefits for the nobility. It was the Sarmatians, then, that became 
the essential element in Poland’s very survival as a modern nation.36  
As described by Adam Zamoyski, the nomadic Sarmatians moved into southeastern 
Europe and continued to act like a warrior caste that protected the existing inhabitants of 
the region, the polanie (field dwellers), from neighboring aggressors. Over time, the 
Sarmatians became agrarians and eventually transformed into a land-owning gentry known 
as the szlachta, and by 1400 represented 8–10 percent of the total population of the 
Kingdom of Poland. Yet this transition into gentry did not replace the monarchy; instead, 
it fundamentally changed the very concept of a monarchy as the basis of nationhood. This 
crucial change instituted republicanism, or representative government, in Poland. 
Formalized by the creation of the Sejm, or Parliament, in 1505, it would be the szlachta, 
not the nobles, who held legislative authority. Although not a representative democracy, as 
the polanie were still obligated to the szlachta and nobles who owned the land, it was the 
first step in Europe toward a form of representative government.37 And, in one of the most 
curious contradictions that characterized the young Polish nation, the szlachta ended 
automatic hereditary succession for the kingdom’s leader in 1569; by mandating that a 
successor be approved by the Sejm, Poland now had an elected monarch.38  
                                                 
36 Wojciech Zembaty, “The Elegant Downfall of the Polish Sarmatians,” Adam Mickiewicz Institute, 
January 14, 2019, https://culture.pl/en/article/the-elegant-downfall-of-the-polish-sarmatians. 
37 Or, as Adam Zamoyski noted, "Clannish and arrogant, the szlachta underpinned its position with 
mutual solidarity and fierce rivalry with other groups. . . . The szlachta thought of itself as a nation, while 
the remaining ninety-odd percent of the population who were the plebs, who did not count." Adam 
Zamoyski, "History of Poland in the 16th-18th Centuries," in Land of the Winged Horsemen: Art in Poland 
1572-1764 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 28. 
38 Adam Zamoyski, Poland: A History (London: HarperPress, 2009).  
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The weakening of obligations to the monarch expanded throughout the sixteenth 
century, a period now described as Poland’s Golden Age of Liberty. Marked by the 
formation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth under an elected monarch in 1569, the 
Warsaw Confederation of 1573 guaranteed voting rights as well as religious freedom to the 
szlachta and townspeople, but not the chłopi, or peasants, who were still tied to the land. 
Although Catholicism remained the official state religion, then, it did not hold that position 
at the exclusion of other faiths. As a result, the early-modern Polish nation was also a 
golden era for Jews, who made Poland the center of Jewish culture through the 1700s.39  
As embedded into the Polish nation during its formation, then, Sarmatian cultural 
beliefs provided the foundation of the Polish nation while embodying elements that were 
in themselves potentially contradictory. Sarmatism expanded the Christian precept—
specifically, the Roman Catholic precept—of the sanctity of all human life to the political 
realm of republicanism. In this sense, every person played a role in the functioning of 
political society. In practical terms, however, this set of cultural beliefs, transformed into a 
political framework, meant governance by the szlachta elite and no meaningful political 
role for the chłopi, a trait that characterizes the nation to this day.40  
This key concept of equality translated directly into the governance and foreign 
policies of the Polish nation through the 1700s, but ultimately with disastrous effects. 
Whereas other European countries centralized national institutions as part of a nation-
building project, Polish lands continued to be self-governed at the local level. Although 
this practice allowed the szlachta to be more responsive in governing the chłopi and 
                                                 
39 Zamoyski, Poland: A History. For more on the relationship between Sarmatian culture and Jewish 
culture and religion, see Jan K. Ostrowski, "Polish Baroque Art and Its Social and Religious Context" in 
Land of the Winged Horsemen: Art in Poland 1572-1764 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 38-
53.  
40 The seeming contradiction of an elite leadership class as embodying civic equality in Sarmatism 
differs from other forms of nationalism in the region. Although references to Sarmatian images in 
contemporary Polish politics do refer to the so-called “common man/woman as opposed to the elites” in 
their messages, they do so in chivalric codes. Moreover, PiS does not follow the laissez-faire liberalism that 
typically characterizes right-wing populism in the region. Wodak, The Politics of Fear, loc. 482. 
Furthermore, as Mochocki suggests, “It was only during the Sarmatian period that the Poles had their own 
truly national culture: developed by Polish citizens themselves, not found outside the Polish-Lithuanian 
state, and universally dominant on its entire territory.” Mochocki, “The Sarmatian Cultural Turn in 21st-
Century Poland,” 209.  
18 
certainly allowed the gentry to amass surplus capital, the lack of a strong central 
government meant that these riches were not diverted to the modernization of the state or 
the economy. Even during the Golden Age, Poland fell behind its neighbors in terms of 
early industrialization, with the gentry preferring to spend their fortunes on material 
displays of wealth.41 Indeed, the curiously Eastern-oriented formal dress and habits of the 
Polish elites were hallmarks of the era, with the szlachta now consciously maintaining the 
Sarmatian origin myth through public rituals that displayed their wealth.42  
Related to the independence and proclaimed equality of the Sarmatians, as 
represented by the szlachta, is the central ideal of wolność, a term that means, variously, 
both freedom and liberty. This concept, too, embedded inherent contradictions into the 
Polish nation. The concept allowed a multi-ethnic Poland to exist as an inherently 
decentralized nation, one built on the concept of a nation of people, not institutions, that 
self-governed without a monarch.43 The Polish nation was not yet defined by ethnicity, 
regionality, clan affiliation, or even language; it did require self-identification with the 
ideals of liberty and freedom. However, this commitment to personal liberty proved to be 
the country’s downfall, as the szlachta failed to reconcile their freedoms with a 
commitment to the nation, whether through taxes or investments in the infrastructure of 
industry. Missing out on both the centralization of its government as well as the initial 
stages of industrialization, Poland’s position in relation to its neighbors was in decline, 
even as the country’s assembled army fought the Battle of Vienna in 1683, which prevented 
the Ottoman Turks from advancing into Europe.44  
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Just as Sarmatism itself embodies many contradictions, so too was the Battle of 
Vienna a contradictory moment in the nation’s history. Although the victory is the most 
notable embodiment of Sarmatism in Poland and saved the country from foreign invasion, 
it also marked the beginning of the end of the early modern Polish nation. 1683 was both 
a high point and a low point for the nation. Having shown that the szlachta could maintain 
the nation’s sovereignty with few obligations to the nation itself, the country fell further 
behind its neighbors in modernizing its governance or economy. Continually attacked by 
Sweden, Turkey, and Austria, chaotically governed by the gentry, and with one succession 
crisis after another in the 1700s, the nation suffered its first partition by its neighbors in 
1772. As Wojciech Zembaty recently observed of its limitations, “The decadent and 
outlandish nobility known as the Polish Sarmatians are often said to have brought down 
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth through their mistakes and hubris.”45  
Even as it led to the country’s dismemberment, Sarmatian nationalism was crucial 
to the very survival of the Polish nation. Because it did not define the nation through 
borders, ethnicity or (as yet) language and religion, the concept proved essential in keeping 
the Polish nation alive, albeit as an imagined construct. As Ewa Thompson observes, “This 
Sarmatian custom allowed Poles (whose ranks began to swell as peasantry gained 
awareness of their Polishness) to survive as a community in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, when they enjoyed no political recognition” and when the country could not be 
found on a map.46 Mindful of its potential destructiveness, Zembaty agrees:  
[Sarmatism] became an identity pattern for Polish nobility, a way of life. 
One of its primary concerns was defending the ‘golden freedom’ of nobles 
against the king’s tyrannical inclinations. Thus, conservative Polish thinkers 
perceive Sarmatism as an original, pure form of Polish republicanism, 
similar to the tradition of the Founding Fathers of the United States.47  
                                                 
45 Zembaty, “The Elegant Downfall of the Polish Sarmatians.” 
46 Ewa Thompson, “Sarmatism, or the Secrets of Polish Essentialism,” in Being Poland: A New 
History of Polish Literature and Culture since 1918, ed. Tamara Trojanowska, Joanna Nyzynska, and 
Przemyslaw Czaplinski (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018), Kindle. 
47 Zembaty, “The Elegant Downfall of the Polish Sarmatians.” 
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Leading alternately to liberty or subjugation, victory or defeat, a fascination with the East 
that was nonetheless parochial and xenophobic, the contradictions of Sarmatism in Polish 
nationalism are still present in the contemporary nation.48 This set of beliefs is especially 
true in its leaders’ responses to global terrorism, in which they have continually presented 
themselves as a modern warrior class defending the Roman Catholic West from an array 
of destructive (yet sometimes unnamed) outside forces.  
  
                                                 
48 As Zdzisław Żygulski, Jr. observed, "Contradictions were to be found in everything [of the Sarmatian 
culture], since while drawing inspiration from Islamic peoples who allegedly resembled the mythical 
Sarmatians, the Poles doggedly fought those pagans, turning Poland into the 'bulwark of Christendom.'" 
Zdzisław Żygulski, Jr., "The Impact of the Orient on the Culture of Old Poland," in Land of the Winged 
Horsemen: Art in Poland 1572-1764 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 70. 
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Table 1. Pivotal Dates in Sarmatian Poland 
966 Poland becomes a Christian nation with the baptism of Mieszko I. 
1505 Sejm takes legislative power from the monarch. 
The Golden Age of Liberty Begins 
1565 Monarch now elected by Sejm. 
1569 Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania established as the first modern Polishnation-state. 
1573 Warsaw Confederation grants rights, including religious freedom to szlachtaand townsfolk. 
1683 The Battle of Vienna 
The Golden Age of Liberty Ends 
1772 The First Partition: The end of the first modern Polish nation-state. 
Table 2. Sarmatian Ideals and Practices 
Warrior class 
Public rituals to commemorate events and transmit meaning 
Chivalric death 
Political equality among the inner group, which governs the people 
Fatalism: fighting a doomed war in the name of honor 
Catholicism as central to preserving the nation and civilization 
Freedom and liberty—nationhood as a voluntary alliance 
“Golden Liberty” under a just ruler who allows the maximum amount of freedom to the 
people 
Every nation a sovereign nation 
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B. DORMANT, THEN ASCENDANT: SARMATISM’S INFLUENCE ON 
CONTEMPORARY POLAND 
Unlike the terrorist events that shaped its formation as a nation after the First World 
War and its reformation as a Soviet-dominated state following the Second World War, 
Poles established a modern, democratic nation in the 1990s, largely without violence. Many 
parties share credit for this achievement. The leadership of the labor union Solidarność 
(Solidarity), whose agenda forced the government to offer free elections in 1989, cannot 
be emphasized enough.49 Nor can the actions of everyday Poles themselves be discounted; 
on March 27, 1981—during a crucial juncture in the relationship between the state and 
Solidarność—12 million people out of a population of 35 million took part in a nationwide, 
half-day strike in support of the union. This mass protest helped to force the government 
into substantial negotiations with the union, an effort that reestablished democracy within 
the decade.50 
These events, of course, did not take place within a vacuum. As recently 
declassified materials make clear, the United States devoted significant resources to 
dissident groups within Poland, including Solidarność.51 And the overwhelmingly 
inefficient, centralized planning system that it shared with other Eastern Bloc countries 
resulted in a massive foreign debt in Poland that significantly hampered consumer 
spending. So, too, did a command economy doom its controlling state, the U.S.S.R., to 
falling further and further behind in maintaining its place as a serious rival to the United 
States, including its ability to control the governance of the Warsaw Pact. Yet the drive to 
replace the command economy with a market-based system; the elimination of domestic 
policies based on directives from Moscow; and the institution of free, democratic processes 
49 Although outside the scope of this thesis, scholars have also argued that Solidarity owed much of its 
success to its exploitation of (Sarmatian) values inherent to Polish ethnocentrism and Roman Catholicism. 
Iana Sabatovych, “Does Nationalism Promote Democracy? Comparative Analyses of Ukraine’s ‘Maidan’ 
Revolution and Poland’s ‘Solidarity’ Mass Mobilisation,” Contemporary Politics 24, no. 2 (2018): 131–52, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2017.1382826. 
50 "Bydoski kryzys - marzec 1981," Solidarność, accessed August 16, 2019, 
http://www.solidarnosc.org.pl/bbial/solidarnosc/bydgoski-kryzys-marzec-1981/ 
51 Seth A. Jones, A Covert Action: Reagan, the CIA, and the Cold War Struggle in Poland (New York: 
Norton, 2018). 
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and institutions would not necessarily follow the demise of socialist Poland. Those 
institutional transformations would be up to the nation’s leaders, and the Poles themselves. 
While the economic reforms of the 1990s transformed parts of Poland’s economy 
through a sort of “shock therapy,” the implementation of democratic initiatives was 
arguably less disruptive.52 But it was chaotic: with so many choices among the newly 
formed political parties, coalition governments became the norm in post-socialist Poland, 
a standard that remains in place to this day. Still, both achievements impressed Western 
observers, who praised the country’s ability to make tough economic decisions to become 
competitive in the world market and to incorporate legitimate, albeit messy, democratic 
procedures. By the millennium, Poland was praised as an example of the triumph of 
Western values, including republicanism and capitalism. The West had won the Cold War, 
and the proof was in Poland.53 
If the integration of market capitalism and Western-style democracy were the 
hallmarks of the apparent Polish transition into the modern capitalist order, its accession 
into NATO symbolized its integration into the West's geopolitical hegemony.54 However, 
the event was not as unambiguous an achievement as was proclaimed by Western 
observers. Even this event, celebrated as another triumph of West (embodied by the United 
States) over East (the now-defunct U.S.S.R.), signified a more complex set of issues that 
went far deeper than direct, geopolitical changes.  
As Piotr Cap outlines in his essay on Poland’s accession into NATO in 1999, for 
example, the continuities with Poland’s past were the most notable rhetorical devices 
invoked by then-President Aleksander Kwaśniewski in his celebratory remarks. As a 
product of the country’s communist past, it would at first seem odd that the president, 
whose rise in politics came directly from his lifelong association with the former ruling 
                                                 
52 Jerzy Lukowski and Hubert Zawadzki, A Concise History of Poland (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). 
53 Wojciech Moskwa, “The Polish ‘Economic Miracle’ Comes with Warnings,” Bloomberg, 
September 27, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-27/the-polish-economic-miracle-
comes-with-warnings. 
54 Gheciu, “Politics of Imagining the Western Security Community.” 
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party, would have stressed historical events and not Poland’s future in his address.55 Even 
more unusual, in light of his support of America’s global war on terror, was Kwaśniewski’s 
avoidance of policy directives or any suggestions concerning Poland’s active role in 
NATO.56 Regardless, the president’s discourse would have seemed perfectly natural, even 
obvious, given his domestic audience and their shared outlook of equal, sovereign nations 
in voluntary association and a sense of Poland’s destiny: “We are a country of stable 
democracy. Independent courts, freedom of speech, and independent local government are 
now taken for granted in Poland. . . . Polish reforms have passed a critical point. They are 
now irreversible.”57 In this sense, joining NATO was not so much a military or geopolitical 
move as it was a natural return to essential Polish national values and its place in the 
international arena. 
In addition to these republican values, Kwaśniewski also emphasized the equality 
of nations symbolized by NATO membership rather than the great military force that 
served as the very rationale for the group’s existence. No longer at war with its neighbors 
or threatened by faraway enemies, belonging to NATO was nevertheless described as 
essentially restoring the nation to “the community of democracies,” in Cap’s observation, 
“a norm contributing to the worldwide stability and peace.”58 In this benign vision of the 
Sarmatian order, the purpose of NATO was not to engage in military action against 
Poland’s enemies, or even to advocate for change in the political cosmos. It was a simple 
recognition, as Jan Józef Lipski had earlier noted in his cautionary essay on nationalism, 
                                                 
55 Piotr Cap, “Further Applications and Concluding Remarks,” in Legitimization in Political 
Discourse: A Cross-Disciplinary Perspective on the Modern US War Rhetoric (Cambridge: Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2006), 121. As Cap notes, a majority of the verbs used in Kwaśniewski’s NATO 
speech in 2004 were in the past tense. 
56 In additional to sending Polish troops to Iraq as part of the U.S.-led Coalition of the Willing, 
Kwaśniewski later admitted to authorizing the CIA to operate “black sites” in Poland to detain and 
interrogate suspected terrorists. Douglas Ernst, “Ex-President Kwasniewski Admits Poland Hosted CIA 
‘Black Sites,’” Washington Post, December 10, 2014, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/dec/ 
10/aleksander-kwasniewski-admits-poland-hosted-cia-bl/. 
57 Cap, “Further Applications and Concluding Remarks,” 121. 
58 Cap, 125. 
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that “every nation has its worth and dignity regardless of whether at any given time it is 
possessed by Hitlerism or some other abomination.”59 
This benign Sarmatian vision of Poland’s place in the new international order 
continued through the 2000s. Although its domestic politics routinely produced chaotic 
results with volatile coalitions forming and dissolving, Poland’s admission into the EU in 
2004 and its continued economic growth seemed to validate the West’s prevailing opinion: 
Poland was like other Western nations after all, it seemed.60 Yet it would not be long before 
the darker side of Sarmatism reasserted itself, a force brought to life in the name of Law 
and Justice.  
  
                                                 
59 Lipski, “Two Fatherlands, Two Patriotisms,” 60. 
60 Mochocki lends a more skeptical view of Poland’s apparently superficial embrace of Western values 
during this period: “In search for a new post-communist identity, going back to the bygone eras was not an 
option compared to the shiny and glamourous Americanization. It was not until now, twenty years later, 
that Sarmatianism seems to be rediscovered. More than that, it seems to be gradually moving from the 
cultural margins to mainstream.” Mochocki, “The Sarmatian Cultural Turn in 21st-Century Poland.” 
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III. THE RISE OF LAW AND JUSTICE IN A SARMATIAN 
CONTEXT: LESSONS FROM THE DICTATOR’S HANDBOOK 
Many Western observers after 9/11 took it as self-evident that Polish leaders would 
eagerly adopt Western counterterrorism policies as their own, so obvious were the horrors 
inflicted by jihadist extremists.61 This policy perspective forgot, as the authors of The 
Dictator’s Handbook note, that “politics is about getting and keeping political power,” not 
about making the world a better or safer place.62 To the extent that Poland eagerly 
participated in efforts by the “Coalition of the Willing” by sending its troops into Iraq or 
allowing secret “black” interrogation sites to be operated on Polish soil, these measures did 
not signify a fundamental, common understanding of the meaning of terrorism or a 
commitment to ending it.63 It was, arguably, in the self-interest of Poland’s political leaders 
to follow these policies; to borrow again from The Dictator’s Handbook, states themselves 
do not have interests. People—such as a nation’s elected officials—do, and it is this set of 
interests that are the driving force of politics.  
The Dictator’s Handbook also brings insight into the dynamism of the political 
discourse on global terrorism in Poland. As the authors note, political survival is best 
achieved by keeping one’s coalition small, with the support of only a few people necessary 
to gain office and stay there. This element has been crucial to the success of the party that 
has dominated Poland’s political landscape for the past decade, Law and Justice, which has 
built its support among a base of conservative, nationalistic, xenophobic, and overtly 
religious followers. In economic terms, Law and Justice has bragged about granting 
pension and “family supplement” benefits to Poles across the country. It has done so while 
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placing its cronies in judicial and bureaucratic positions as a symbol of its revolt against 
the supposed elites oriented toward a more internationalist position. The party has also 
propagandized the alleged (but unreal) mass migration of North Africans and Middle 
Easterners into the country as an assault on its borders and used the only documented 
instance of a Polish victim of a terrorist attack—a truck driver who was killed during the 
Berlin Christmas Market attack in 2016—as evidence of Poland’s existence as a “martyr” 
nation to outside, Western interests, especially Germany.64  
With its success dependent on a small coalition of supporters, how has Law and 
Justice prevailed with a set of policies that are narrowly nationalistic and isolationist? 
Again borrowing from The Dictator’s Handbook, there are three primary groups in 
Poland’s political landscape; see Table 3. Law and Justice has skillfully manipulated each 
one of them to retain power. 
Table 3. PiS and the Modern Sarmatian State: An Analysis 
through The Dictator’s Handbook 
Interchangeables Voters chłopi 
Nominal rights; 
voting power 
diluted by the 
parliamentary 
system 
Influentials PiS Party Chairs szlachta 
Control legislation; 
accountable to 
party, not voters 
Essentials Jarosław Kaczyński king 
No direct legislative 
authority; not in 
elective office but 
approves all actions 
64 Law and Justice Party leaders accused the truck driver’s German employers of delaying his delivery, 
thereby leading to his abduction and death. Włodzimierz Szczepański, “Państwo zadba o rodzinę kierowcy, 
który zginął w Berlinie.” 
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The “interchangeables,” or the voters in Poland’s democratic system, are the largest 
political grouping. This group includes voters currently living outside the nation’s borders. 
The group is largely unsupportive of Law and Justice, which holds a bare majority of both 
houses of the Polish parliament despite receiving less than 38 percent of the popular vote 
in the last national election.65 This group generally has favored EU and NATO membership 
and has benefitted from non–Law and Justice economic policies oriented toward market 
capitalism, as the country’s economy has grown continuously for the past quarter century. 
(Remarkably, Poland was the sole European nation not to see a setback during the global 
recession after 2008.)66 Given the economic success of the past quarter century and 
Poland’s ascendency into the EU and NATO, however, members of the group are generally 
satisfied by the progress they have witnessed in Poland’s fortunes during their lifetimes. 
This satisfaction has led to some political disengagement that allows Law and Justice’s 
representatives to make unpopular political decisions without generating serious 
opposition.67 
The “influentials” are the party chairs of Law and Justice. They are the group who 
put forth the party’s candidates to the voters and who chose the prime minister and the 
Council of Ministers, which set domestic and foreign policies. Tellingly, it is widely 
acknowledged by political observers both within Poland and internationally that the most 
important politician in the country is, in fact, not an elected official at all but rather the 
chairman of Law and Justice.68 The influentials largely are elected officials themselves but 
have kowtowed to the chairman at public events and have refrained from criticizing his 
controversial statements. The influentials owe their positions to the chairman; their 
                                                 
65 James Traub, “The Party That Wants to Make Poland Great Again,” New York Times Magazine, 
November 2, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/06/magazine/the-party-that-wants-to-make-poland-
great-again.html?_r=0.  
66 Moskwa, “The Polish ‘Economic Miracle.’”  
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68 Mazzini, “Poland’s Historical Revisionism”; and Tworzecki, “Poland: A Case of Top-Down 
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ideological commitment is harder to gauge.69 As is discussed in the forthcoming chapter, 
however, the members of this group are highly skilled in the visual and rhetorical displays 
of Sarmatism during pivotal moments related to the country’s terrorist experience. It is as 
though, in Zembaty’s observation, “the key component that propelled Sarmatism on[,] the 
duty of protecting the country’s borders from Islamic enemies,” has never really gone 
away.70 
The “essentials,” to complete the trio of The Dictator’s Handbook, include just one 
person—Lech Kaczyński, chairman of the Law and Justice Party. A long-time political 
advisor, Kaczyński held elective national office for only a few months as prime minister in 
a coalition government in 2006–2007. Acknowledged as the dominant political figure in 
the country, Kaczyński deferred obtaining a formal position as prime minister or president 
as many polls showed him to be decidedly unpopular with most Poles.71 Like other 
nationalist leaders in Central Europe, Kaczyński is profoundly isolationist and an 
interlocutor of international conspiracy theories claiming to show that his country is the 
target of nefarious foreign influences. He has been especially critical of the EU and its 
handling of the recent refugee crisis, arguing that Poland has been treated as a second-rank 
member of the alliance.72 This last issue has been a recurring one in Kaczyński’s speeches 
and one that has largely gone unchallenged by Western leaders, despite an EU lawsuit 
against Poland to force it to stick to the organization’s resettlement policies.  
Along with other PiS leaders, Kaczyński has been astonishingly adept at 
manipulating the Sarmatian discourse to exploit real or imagined threats, including 
terrorism, in supposed defense of the Polish nation. As Piotr Cap shows in his analysis of 
speeches on immigration by PiS leaders in the 18 months after they gained leadership in 
the Polish government in November 2015, the party engaged in “us-versus-them” discourse 
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to portray outsiders as a terrorist threat to the nation. Skilled at reading opinion polls and 
adjusting the party’s message accordingly, PiS relied on anti-immigration rhetoric by 
labeling migrants “as a growing threat to Poland’s national security” at a time when the 
party’s approval ratings needed a boost.73 This description of an existential threat would 
perhaps not have been successful but for two additional factors. First, during the massive 
influx of refugees into Europe in 2015, the party could point to actual scenes of chaos 
induced by the mass migration in places such as Budapest, where migrants camped out in 
bus and train stations.74 Even more important than the headlines that summer, however, 
was the party’s ability to weave essential Sarmatian values into its anti-migrant statements.  
One factor that did not need manipulation, however, was the constant emphasis on 
wolność as a central tenet of nationhood. Common among the statements of PiS leaders, in 
Cap’s estimation, is that “at the heart of [PiS’s] rhetoric lies a strong appeal to the sense of 
‘independence,’ which serves to invoke core elements of the national heritage in order to 
define and legitimize the current and future responsibilities.”75 President Kwaśniewski, it 
has been argued, did much the same thing in advocating for EU and NATO membership 
as a means for delivering Poland to its rightful destiny as an equal in the democratic 
community of nations. How could the same values lead to such different outcomes in the 
space of less than a decade? Part of the answer lies in the effective weaponization of 
Sarmatian values by Kaczyński and PiS.76 
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IV. UNCEASING TERROR: THE SARMATIAN POLITICS OF 
LAW AND JUSTICE 
Unlike the United States, Poland has not suffered a direct terrorist attack in the 
contemporary era. However, global terrorism has had an impact on the nation’s political 
rhetoric, with significant implications on its domestic and foreign policies.77 This analysis 
focuses on three of the most pivotal events attributed to terrorism in the past decade, 
beginning with a plane crash that killed many of the country’s leaders in 2010; continuing 
with the so-called EU migrant crisis from Africa and South Asia in 2015; and concluding 
with the death of Polish truck driver Łukasz Urban, who was killed in a terrorist attack in 
Berlin in 2016. The response and narrative by Poland’s political leaders are then analyzed 
in terms of the constructed discourse, including its political goals, and the impact of this 
dialogue on the country’s domestic and foreign policies.  
A. THE MYTH OF SMOLEŃSK: A MODERN SARMATIAN RITUAL 
Perhaps the most tragic national event in Poland’s contemporary history occurred 
on April 10, 2010, when a plane carrying President Lech Kaczyński and his entourage 
crashed into a wooded area outside of Smoleńsk, Russia. The accident killed all 96 people 
on board. Although it was determined that the accident resulted from pilot error—the crew 
felt pressured to land the plane despite extremely unfavorable conditions—conspiracy 
theories immediately sprang up that alleged the crash was an act of terrorism. For the next 
eight years, the Law and Justice Party conducted not just annual but monthly 
commemorations of the accident. As the leader of the party, Lech Kaczyński’s twin 
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brother, Jarosław Kaczyński, reminded the public, “He rekindled Poland’s national 
consciousness and restored its honor.”78  
But why would PiS go to such lengths to shape what was clearly an accident into a 
terrorist event, and Lech Kaczyński into a martyr for his country? Part of the reason stems 
from the country’s historical vision of itself as a martyr nation; after all, the plane going to 
Smoleńsk was taking party leaders to a commemoration of the Katyń massacre of 1940, 
when the occupying Soviet Army slaughtered some 22,000 Polish military leaders, 
academics, and politicians in an attempt to eliminate the country’s ruling elite. Another 
reason was the underlying politics that immediately preceded the Smoleńsk trip. Just three 
days before, the leader of PiS’s rival party in the government, Prime Minister Donald Tusk 
of the Civic Platform, had traveled to Smoleńsk for the commemoration but had pointedly 
not invited Kaczyński to go with him.79  
Thus were interwoven the toxic threads that produced the myth of Smoleńsk, a 
terrorist event that never actually happened. As Minister of National Defense (and PiS 
Deputy) Antoni Macierewicz bluntly stated in the year after the crash, “We were the first 
victim of terrorism in the 1930s, and in Smoleńsk we can say that we were also the first 
big victim of terrorism in the modern conflict that unfolds before our eyes.”80 Joined with 
Jarosław Kaczyński’s unrelenting mourning of his brother, the nation was constantly 
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reminded that PiS’s political opponents, never named directly but ranging from the Civic 
Platform to the European Union to Russia, were also enemies of Poland.81  
As noted by scholar Michał Mochocki, PiS’s adaptation of Sarmatic tropes was 
cemented by the Smoleńsk crash, which killed the self-identified Sarmatian hero, Lech 
Kaczyński.82 In the short term, this nationalist, xenophobic, and paranoid message was 
effective, as it helped PiS gain the upper hand over the Civic Platform in the parliamentary 
elections of 2015, when it won a narrow majority over its rivals. Among its campaign 
promises was a pledge to reopen the initial investigation into the Smoleńsk crash, a promise 
that was never fulfilled despite Jarosław Kaczyński’s repeated statements that the truth 
would soon be known about the event. Eight years after the crash, Kaczyński quietly 
stopped appearing at the monthly commemorations of his brother’s death.83 Even so, in 
these years, the commemoration of the myth of Smoleńsk demonstrated the Sarmatian 
“predilection for celebrating anniversaries, monuments and rituals of all kinds,” a habit that 
served only to sow mistrust in Poland’s neighbors and its own political process.84 
The attention that PiS devoted to the fictitious terrorist event came at the expense 
of the government’s credibility among its domestic and international critics, yet the 
political capital that it temporarily created for PiS was a lesson well learned by the party’s 
leaders.85 As the party’s history in the following decade has shown, it was a lesson that it 
would use again and again in responding to terrorist events—or events that it could link to 
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terrorism—by creating a nationalistic, xenophobic narrative based on half-truths and 
outright lies. As journalist Jarosław Kociszewski noted in 2018, a time when PiS had 
consolidated its rule, “The illiberal trend is [now] driven rather by a fear of fictitious 
enemies, i.e. Islamic migrants, Germans, than Smoleńsk.”86 
B. THE EU MIGRANT CRISIS: SARMATISM AND TOXIC CHRISTIANITY 
Indeed, the fictitious enemy of Islamic migrants as alleged invading terrorists was 
the dominant response of the Polish government to the EU migrant crisis of 2015. During 
that year, just over one million people entered the EU illegally, with half coming from 
Syria. The most common means of travel was by sea from Turkey to Greece, with about 
800,000 migrants making the journey that year. Most claimed refugee status from civil or 
ethnic conflicts in their home countries, with Syria’s ongoing civil war the greatest factor 
in the sudden upsurge in migration. Although bound by international conventions to claim 
refugee status in the first safe country they entered, most of the refugees intended to go to 
final destinations such as Germany, the United Kingdom, or Sweden due to job 
opportunities or family connections.87  
Immediately after taking office as the governing party of Poland in October 2015, 
PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński decried the influx of EU migrants as a security threat. 
Stating that Poland would not abide by its agreement as an EU member to take in some 
asylum seekers, he stated, “After recent events connected with acts of terror, [Poland] will 
not accept refugees because there is no mechanism that would ensure security.”88 Although 
he offered no direct evidence of a terrorist plot linked to the EU migrant crisis and 
overlooked the fact that none of the migrants were attempting to reach Poland, Kaczyński’s 
blunt definition of the migrants as potential terrorists left no ambiguity. Kaczyński and 
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other PiS leaders refused to discuss the migrant crisis as anything other than a terrorist 
threat to the country.89 
A review of the discourse articulated by PiS leadership, including Kaczyński, Prime 
Minister Beata Szydło, Minister of Foreign Affairs Witold Waszczykowski, and Minister 
of the Interior Mariusz Błaszczak, reads like a warped and weaponized primer on the 
Sarmatian expression of Polish nationhood. In ritualistic fashion, these speakers have 
emphasized again and again that foreign migration, embodied by refugees, is a threat to the 
safety of the Polish nation and an attack on its freedom. In a May 2016 speech, Kaczyński 
directly linked “national sovereignty” to the “equal rights and social justice” and “peace, 
stability and economic progress” that the republic’s citizens had earned. “We derive it from 
our Christian heritage, the values to which our nation has been committed for centuries and 
to which we are committed today.” Kaczyński added, “We do not take foreign orders.”90 
The following month, Waszczykowski again placed “our freedom and security” above all 
other values in explaining why Poland would not follow EU policies for accepting migrants 
into the country. Like Kaczyński, he equated following EU directives with the 
abandonment of Poland’s very sovereignty: “We will be in charge in our own country,” he 
declared.91  
PiS leaders continued with their migrants-as-terrorists rhetoric even after the EU 
sued Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic for abrogating their commitments to take 
in migrants. Party leaders were also unfazed by criticism that highlighted their hypocrisy 
on migrant policies as applied to the largest number of asylum seekers in the country, those 
from neighboring war-torn Ukraine. By 2017, migration to Poland was at a record high, 
with almost a quarter million foreigners applying for work permits, an increase of 258 
percent from 2014. But over 80 percent of these migrants were from Ukraine, a fact the 
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PiS awkwardly ignored in its continuing anti-migrant stance.92 Poland’s reaction to the 
migrant crisis damaged the country’s standing in the EU, a membership that, ironically, 
was designed to help protect the sanctity of the country’s borders.93  
C. THE DEATH OF ŁUKASZ URBAN: A SARMATIAN MARTYR FOR 
POLAND 
With EU ties fragmenting, PiS leaders did further damage to the relationship with 
its largest trading partner, neighboring Germany, with their reaction to the only 
documented case of a Polish citizen being killed in a terrorist attack in the nation’s 
contemporary history. The victim, Łukasz Urban, was a truck driver who was abducted 
along with his vehicle by a supporter of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), who then 
drove the truck into Berlin’s main Christmas market, killing 12 people.94 Even as the media 
reported the brutal nature of Urban’s death, PiS leaders suggested that it was not just a 
terrorist act by a jihadist but one that also implicated Germany. If Urban, who was 
attempting to deliver his shipment of steel to a German factory a day early, had not been 
turned away and forced to wait overnight to complete his task, he would not have been 
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killed, according to this conspiracy. Such was the account peddled by PiS-oriented media 
outlets both within Poland and abroad.95  
But how was an extra-territorial terrorist attack on a Polish citizen transformed from 
an ISIS plot into an attack by a long-standing ally and its most important trading partner 
on the Polish nation itself? Viewing Urban’s death as a Sarmatian event provides an 
answer. As Mochocki notes in his analysis of the mainstreaming of Sarmatian literary 
themes in Poland's culture after 2000, “It was the honest and brave Sarmatian nobleman, 
skilled in fencing, shooting and riding who was the typical protagonist.”96 Although 
Urban’s truck was not a substitute for a horse, the images that accompanied reports of the 
attack consistently showed him riding high in his cab and emphasized (the later disproved 
account) that he had fought the attacker even after being shot.97 Media accounts 
consistently highlighted his skills as a driver who would not take even a drop of alcohol a 
day before he was to drive; his conscientious work habits, which, fatally, had led him to 
show up early to pick up his delivery; and his devotion to his wife and family. It was to his 
wife that he made his last (unanswered) phone call and with his family that he hoped to 
reunite in time for Christmas.98  
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Thus, it was through a Sarmatian lens that the death of Urban was described in 
media accounts as a chivalric death that symbolized the existential threats to the Roman 
Catholic Polish nation.99 News reports claimed, despite the many unknowns related to his 
abduction and death, that he had fought until the end and was, in fact, responsible for the 
terrorist driver swerving away from the main pathway in the market, thereby preventing 
the death toll from being higher. Valiantly fighting a doomed battle, the truck driver was 
not so much a victim of terrorism as a Sarmatian hero symbolizing, once again, Poland’s 
fight against external forces. For, as events leading up to his funeral demonstrated, this 
Sarmatian hero was brought down not just by a terrorist but by the machinations of 
neighboring Germany, the country’s most crucial European neighbor and the dominant 
force in the EU.100  
An implicit criticism of German efficiency and hidebound rule-following was made 
explicit in the days leading up to Urban’s funeral, as German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
was excoriated for not calling the victim’s family. She was also faulted for not attending 
the funeral, which witnessed Polish President Andrzej Duda kneeling on the bare church 
floor at Urban’s coffin and kissing the widow’s hand in another act of chivalry.101 With 
these acts, Urban was mythologized by far-right commentators as not just a hero for 
fighting against his attacker but also a martyr to the Polish nation and a symbol of its 
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continuing victimization by the historical German aggressor.102 The acts also symbolized 
the rapidly deteriorating relationship between Poland and Germany, which some observers 
view as the most significant strategic alliance to counter Russia’s influence in the region.103 
Even a year after the attack, some in Poland continued to complain that German leaders 
had not shown sufficient respect to Urban’s family by not sending Chancellor Merkel to 
meet with them directly. And Urban’s cousin, who owned the trucking firm that had 
employed him, complained that his truck had still not been returned to him, a situation that 
he described as “a matter of honor.”104  
D. THE ENDURING INFLUENCE OF SARMATIAN NATIONALISM IN 
CONTEMPORARY POLAND 
Polish responses to events of global terrorism since 2010 have baffled Western 
observers. Using Western definitions of the nation rooted in market capitalism, political 
and social liberalism, and an orientation toward the West, their analyses have failed to 
explain the rise and continuing dominance of the nationalistic and xenophobic PiS. When 
analyzed as part of the Sarmatian discourse, however, the exploitation of these three 
terrorist incidents during the last decade shows how deeply embedded Sarmatism is in 
Polish nationhood. Furthermore, it shows how its values can be linked to the contemporary 
nation’s experience with global terrorism, real or imagined, for the political advantage of 
the ruling party. Until that discourse is disrupted or replaced by equally convincing rhetoric 
that coincides with Sarmatian values, it is not likely that the toxic elements of Sarmatism 
will be addressed and confronted.  
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As the experience with the myth of Smoleńsk and the death of Łukasz Urban show, 
public rituals, especially those linked to martyrdom and Christianity, have an immediate, 
visceral impact on the Polish psyche. Although monthly public commemorations of a non-
existent terrorist event for eight years may seem bizarre to Western observers, they have 
been effective in pushing PiS to ruling status by continually reminding the public of the 
death of PiS leaders in the plane crash. They were also effective in broadcasting an 
undefined conspiracy theory that allowed PiS to allege an existential threat to the nation; 
the ritual reinforced this idea by making the monthly ceremony overtly religious (and 
Roman Catholic) in nature. Likewise, the widely broadcast funeral of truck driver Urban, 
routinely described as a hero instead of a victim, transformed Poland once again into a 
martyr nation, with the president paying homage, Sarmatian-style, by kneeling on a bare 
floor in front of his coffin.105  
Likewise, the EU migrant crisis of 2015 was shaped to parallel perhaps the best-
known Sarmatian moment, the Battle of Vienna in 1683. In both instances, Polish leaders 
specifically referred to an Islamic (or Ottoman) threat not only to Poland but also to Europe 
and Christianity itself. As a modern Sarmatian event, of course, PiS leaders overlooked the 
fact that the Ottoman Turks were actual invaders in a military campaign; the comparison 
of invading Turks with migrants attempting to go to England, Germany, and Sweden hardly 
compares. Nevertheless, the image of migrants as another coming of Ottomans was a 
political boon for PiS insomuch as Sarmatian values came into play with the event.106  
The Sarmatian foundation of PiS’s strategic response to military and terrorist 
threats is also seen in the current foreign policy initiative to build a massive U.S. military 
base on Polish soil. President Duda at first jokingly called the project “Fort Trump” in a 
blatant attempt to appeal to the U.S. leader’s ego.107 Predictably, the leaked announcement 
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was treated at first as a joke, another jab at evading the country’s commitment to the EU 
by dealing unilaterally with the United States and a leader with a similar political platform. 
Based as it is on a Sarmatian ethos of making a grand show of one's warrior status, wealth, 
and grandeur, however, the project appears not just possible but predestined as the default 
response by Poland to military threats. In this sense, the country’s ascension to NATO was 
not a natural development but rather a happy accident; it is the country’s desire to build 
Fort Trump that is far more revealing about how Sarmatian nationalism is its most enduring 
value. 
Although Poland gladly joined NATO as a symbol of its equality with other 
European nations, in true Sarmatian fashion, it haltingly accepted only the minimum 
responsibilities to the guild's common policies. Over time, it rejected some of these 
responsibilities, from accepting migrants to upholding rulings relating to civil liberties as 
ordered by the EU Court of Justice, as an infringement on its sovereignty. In the Fort Trump 
project, then, PiS leaders found a venue that allowed them, once again, to assert their 
freedom from EU values, allowing them to enact autocratic measures affecting the 
judiciary, media, and civil rights by making these moves in the name of Poland’s liberty 
and defense of its culture.108 The project also harkened back to the days of ostentatious 
displays of wealth by the Sarmatians, even when such expenditures were obviously 
foolish.109 As one former U.S. official bluntly recognized, the base represents no benefit to 
America, to the EU, or even to Poland itself, given that Russia has no current purpose in 
invading Poland and every disincentive against it.110 Even if a Russian attack were to 
happen—unlikely given that its population and economy are dwarfed by that of the EU as 
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a whole—it is questionable whether the United States would respond in any meaningful 
way. One only has to think about America’s abstention from acting on Russia’s military 
presence in the Donbas region of Ukraine, let alone its occupation of Crimea.111 
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V. CONCLUSIONS: RESPONSES TO PIS’S MANIPULATION OF 
NATIONALISM AND TERRORISM 
The nationalistic and xenophobic strategic responses to terrorist events (whether 
real or fictitious) have alienated Poland and the other Visegrád nations from their EU and 
NATO partners, especially Germany.112 The constant refrain of lies and half-truths used 
by the leaders of PiS in their strategic responses have also undermined their credibility, 
domestically and internationally. This strategy has led to a loss in confidence by the public 
in their nation’s institutions, including the government, the judiciary, and the media.113 The 
attempts by PiS to decrease its multilateral engagements with the EU and NATO while 
seeking unilateral agreements with the United States, for example, have arguably increased 
the power and influence of Russia, a historic aggressor, in the region.114 As Mateusz 
Mazzini recently noted, “Poland remains one of very few countries in Eastern Europe that 
does not have a mainstream political party openly backed by the Kremlin. But it does not 
need one. The revisionist politics of the current Polish government plays right into 
Moscow’s hands.”115 
Looking at Poland’s response to global terrorism through a Sarmatian lens may 
help to recalibrate its relationship with the West. Sticking to the rules laid out in The 
Dictator’s Handbook, the only change that will likely alter the current trajectory is to 
destroy the effectiveness of Kaczyński’s xenophobic and nationalistic platform that 
capitalizes on the rhetoric of global terrorism to maintain support among his narrow base 
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of followers.116 The first step in this process will be to educate Western leaders on how 
Poles themselves view the history of terrorism and its actual impact, whether real or 
imagined, on their own country. As discussed in this thesis, understanding how Poles have 
experienced terrorism in the context of their nationhood will be particularly vital in 
reorienting this rhetoric to a more internationalist and liberal agenda.  
In challenging Kaczyński’s definition of terrorism, Western policymakers must 
emphasize Poland’s place in the Western coalition and not just a special partner with an 
equally Eurosceptic United States.117 While reassuring Poles that its borders are sacrosanct, 
then, these leaders must acknowledge that the country’s history has been shaped countless 
times by foreign forces; despite these challenges, democracy has always been a possibility. 
It will also be helpful to remind Polish voters and Law and Justice leaders that fighting 
against EU policies on supposed counterterrorism grounds will be especially harmful to 
the country at a time when EU infrastructure investments, which had begun after the 
country’s admission to the EU in 2004, are set to expire.118  
In addition to targeting Kaczyński as an agent who does not represent the best 
interests of his nation, Western counterterrorism policymakers may draw guidance from 
Democracy for Realists to help in a campaign to draw Poland back into the Western 
coalition. As the authors note, people are swayed more by current feelings about the 
national mood, the economy, and social issues than by actual analysis of policies.119 From 
this perspective, the ability of Law and Justice to conflate terrorism with a xenophobic 
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stand against immigration and all EU policies in general makes sense, even if this stance 
is hardly supported by economic data, historical experience, or even the rule of law itself.  
Building on this idea that voters cast their votes based on their social identities, not 
policy preferences or ideologies, it may be possible to redefine the socio-political meaning 
of global terrorism to reinforce Poland’s ties to the West and inhibit the trend toward 
isolationism. There is a crucial need, then, to address the political rhetoric of Law and 
Justice that defines terrorist incidents (whether real or prophesized) as attacks against 
Poland, specifically, making it again a martyred, isolated nation. Instead, political leaders 
should take every measure to confront and deconstruct the semantic fallacies of Kaczyński 
and others who use terrorism as a convenient trope to advance xenophobic policies. As 
Iana Sabtovych recently observed, “Although nationalistic moods sharpen during a 
crisis . . . whether these moods gain ‘good’ or ‘bad’ qualities depends on the ability of 
political leaders to produce and deliver a better consensus.”120 And, as Wojciech 
Przybylski recently asked,  
PiS’s base has been revived and invigorated by several conspiracy 
theories—from the Smoleńsk crash to a plot of liberal elites working against 
Poland—and within these theories everything that contradicts it 
paradoxically strengthens the power of the faithful in these conspiracies. 
But what about the voters who are in the middle and can be swayed to or 
away from a party guided by their own independent judgment?121  
Gaining an understanding of how Poles interpret the rhetoric of global terrorism through a 
Sarmatian lens is only a first step in this process of productive coalition building.  
Although no longer an emerging economy or a nation behind the Iron Curtain, 
Poland’s contemporary political scene is still crucial to the fate of any Western alliance. 
The continuing ability of its current leaders to manipulate the rhetoric of global terrorism 
to further their own advantages should not be discounted by Western policymakers, but 
rather confronted. In this sense, the words of Czech dissident and eventual President Vaclav 
Havel are informative. Writing about the nature of post-totalitarian politics in his essay 
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“The Power of the Powerless,” he observed the corrosive effect of unchecked lies led to “a 
mere ritual, a formalized language deprived of semantic contact with reality and 
transformed into a system of ritual signs that replace reality with pseudo-reality.”122 In the 
fake-news world of contemporary Polish politics—alas, a malady not confined to that 
country—truth to power must once again be advocated with every means at hand.123  
Western leaders can also help Poles build on their legacy of using the power of civil 
society to influence its political leaders. As David Ost notes in his work Solidarity and the 
Politics of Anti-Politics, it was the introduction of non-political groups into the political 
process in the 1970s and 1980s that led to the democratic transformation of the nation.124 
This achievement would arguably not have been possible without the overt and sometimes 
covert assistance of Western leaders and institutions. The same mutual dialogue is just as 
vital today, a time when the political arena in Poland has become less representative, less 
transparent, and less responsive to the demands of its citizens for good government.125  
It should also be recognized that for all of the positive aspects of tolerance and 
service to humanity, there is another element of Sarmatism that is potentially quite toxic: 
based on its embrace of Roman Catholic Christianity (and the bulwark of such in the West) 
as well as its proclaimed centrality to Polish nationhood, Sarmatism carries within it the 
potential for xenophobia, especially against Islam. It was not by accident that the Australian 
man who staged a terrorist attack on an Auckland, New Zealand, mosque in March 2019 
                                                 
122 Vaclav Havel, “The Power of the Powerless,” in The Power of the Powerless: Citizens against the 
State in Central-Eastern Europe (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1985), 32. 
123 As Mateusz Mazzini notes, the “profoundly revisionist,” “exclusive,” and “all-encompassing” 
rhetoric of PiS ironically mirrors that of the Communist Party, which its members protested against. 
Mazzini, “Poland’s Historical Revisionism.” 
124 David Ost, Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics: Opposition and Reform in Poland since 1968 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990). 
125 In a sign that civil society has begun to organize outside the political arena against Law and Justice, 
a series of protests across most major cities since 2015 have protested the party’s stand on placing political 
appointees in judicial positions, limiting the rights on public gatherings, banning abortion procedures, 
taking control of the country’s public media outlets, and “Polonizing” the financial assets of some of the 
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cited the Sarmatian victory of Polish-led forces in the 1683 Battle of Vienna over the 
Ottoman Turks in his “manifesto” as proof of Christianity’s struggle against Islam.126  
This toxic side of Christian Sarmatism is also evident in the turn toward 
homophobia in PiS’s campaign for the November 2019 parliamentary election. It is almost 
as if Kaczyński and other PiS leaders took to reading the same speech from several years 
ago, just replacing the word “migrants” with “gays.” Speaking out against EU rules 
banning discrimination based on sexual orientation, for example, Kaczyński said at a 
March 2019 PiS rally, “We need to fight this. We need to defend the Polish family. We 
need to defend it furiously because it’s a threat to civilization, not just for Poland but for 
the entire Europe, for the entire civilization that is based on Christianity.”127 Thus, the toxic 
strain of Christianity in Sarmatism continues to permeate PiS’s world view, with equally 
devastating effects on the nation.128 
Integrating an understanding of the Sarmatian basis of the Polish nation, then, may 
allay some of the confusion that has plagued Western commentators over the past decade, 
especially over Poland’s invocation of the global war on terror in response to various 
contemporary events. Joining NATO and the EU, when viewed in light of the nation’s 
Sarmatian nature, did not mean that it had embraced essential Western values such as 
market capitalism, social liberalism, and multilateralism. It is now clear that joining these 
two powerful blocs did not mean it had actively decided to break with its past and take on 
an extensive set of international responsibilities that might curtail its own perceived 
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liberties and freedoms.129 Nor did it mean that the country was itself becoming more liberal 
or secular. Even as the country’s material wealth has prospered over the last quarter 
century, it remains profoundly spiritual and profoundly Christian—that is, essentially 
Sarmatian. Any set of foreign policies toward Poland must not forget that essential value 
of Polish nationalism, despite the contradictions it embodies. And Poles themselves must 
realize that Sarmatian ideals, which led to the foundation of the modern Polish nation-state 
and allowed it to survive the Partitions, was also the root cause of its demise. If left 
unchecked, these ideals may turn the eagle’s head once again from wolność to self-inflicted 
martyrdom.  
                                                 
129 Alternatively, as Wojciech Przybylski notes in a recent essay, “Ideas have consequences. Just as it 
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